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mE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE ANO SOCIAL CONSCIENCE 
by 
ABRAHAM EDEL 
At the recent annual meetings of professional philosophers last 
December. there arose in connection with a proposed resolution on Viet­
nam the perennial question whether philosophers as a professional group 
should pass resolutions on political issues. From press accounts at the 
time it appeared that comparable arguments occurted among historians, 
economists, and others - not only social scientists , but also assembled 
physical and natural scientists at the AAAS. concerning a variety of 
proposals for steps toward social action. It is not surprising that in a 
time of crisis, such as the present clearly is, the problem of the responsi­
bilities of science as science, or rather of scientists as scientists, 
should constantly recur. What is more surprising is that it should keep 
coming back in the same old terms and with the same old dichotomies , 
and - in spite of 20th century philosophy having been characterized as 
an Age of Analysis - without a clearer analysis of the questions them­
selves and their presuppositions. It is as if we started with some fixed 
definition of the scientist, whether the layman 's image of a father-figure 
in a white coat (engendered by TV advertising) or the philosopher's 
fallibilistic doubter of Introductory Philosophy courses. And it is as if 
we started with some fixed definition of the social conscience, or what 
comes to the same thing. the sense of social responsibility, embodying 
the usual preconceptions of our culture wittl the hard·line division be· 
tween the individual and the social. And it is as if we simply held up and 
compared the two pictures and reported that there was or was not a path 
between the two conceptions . 
Now I want to maintain in this paper that there is something very 
wrong with this procedure and its results. I want to argue that the scien­
tific enterprise is a historically changing enterprise and its responsibili­
ties do not flow simply from its perennial features but from its place in a 
given time and a given level of social development. And similarly we 
shall see that the sense of social responsibility does not take its charac­
te:- from the perennial features of the human conscience alone , but from 
the whole socio-cultural complex in its historical development. Hence 
any picture of the relations of the two that we have rests on assumed 
pictures of the whole of the human world in its operations in our age . 
Once we realize this we can see how complex is the scope of our problem 
if it is to issue in genuinely evaluative conclusions about the responsi­
bilities of science in the comtemporary world . 
39 
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I11 what follows I shall therefore begin with the changing character 
of the scientific enterprise. then go on to the changing character of social 
responsibilities of science. For brevity, I label the sections "The Scien· 
tific Enterprise," · 'Social Conscience ." and " . . . and . . .  " 
I. THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE 
The material and sociological changes in the scientific enterprise 
are familiar enough and need be barely indicated. The number of people 
carrying on the enterprise of science is vasrly increased - it is said that 
there are more scientists now alive and at work than the past total in all 
human history. Science is more systematically organized in its pursuit, 
though fragmentary at many points along its front. I t  has large resources. 
Basic research is now encouraged and subsidized, not merely applied 
research. Sociologically, it is not a self·determining field. In spite of the 
occasional dreams of technocracy or the entry of occasional individuals 
into the directory of ruling classes. science is the servant, not the Pla­
tonic guardian . It has many masters and many strings by which it is 
pulled. even when it is in the freer atmosphere of the better university, 
and its practitioners can soothe themselves with a truth-for-truth's-sake 
ideology. We know that some foremost scientists have even shifted from 
physics to theoretical biology. despairing of any physical research as 
being out of the grasp of a war machine. By comparison to the war ma­
chine the relation of the scientific enterprise to business and the search 
for profits seemed almost benign, till sociology produced the concept of 
the ... military-industrial complex"! I need not scan here the range of 
questions that the more radical scientists today are pressing upon us 
about the permeation of the scientific enterprise by the immoral aspects 
of the Establishment. At this point I want to explore rather the internal 
changes in the scientific enterprise - both in the theory of knowledge llnd 
in the practical attitudes of men - that the progress of science has 
brought about; for it is these changes, I shall argue, that determine the 
responsibility of scientists in the contemporary world. I want to distin· 
guish four such changes: 
40 
(1) A shift in the view of human interference in the 
course of events. 
(2) The growth of science to the point where we no 
longer set up theoretical barriers to its possible 
scope. 
(3) The development of what may be called an " e co· 
logical mode of thought'' .  
(4) An apparent change in the relation o f  practice to 
theory in the scientific enterptise. 
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(1) The rT1Dtle/ of human inter(ercncc. Men have always wanted to 
extend their control of the world and themselves , and in pr1m1tive socie­
ties we find magical endeavors . But the ideal of science has not always 
been associated with that of control. In ancient Greek philosophy the 
ideal of science was the intellectual grasp of the eternal. what could not 
be otherw 1se; the purer the science, therefore . the less the extent of 
human control! The idea of knowledge as power had a slow growth. We 
can see this clearly in the human attitudes to crisis. F'irst there is a kind 
of weather-model; you wait till the crisis blows over. if you are lucky. 
Economic crises were treated in this way till quite recently. Then there 
is the intervention-model: you intervene but only to remove obstacles and 
hindrances. so that nature can take its course. This was the medical 
model under the older teleological approach that nature works ror the best. 
With the Cartesian view of the body as a machine, the idea of fashioning. 
interfering to shape and control. came to the fore: now some go so far as 
to see the body as a mechanism with replaceable . even improvable parts . 
In the social field. resistance to intervention is old. We may recall Aris­
totle's story. m his Politics, o( the society m which one who moved a 
change in the laws had a halter put around his neck. and if his motion 
lost, he was hanged on the spot. The adulation of tradition . whether in 
the British conception of the common law as a slow unconscious growth 
or in a Burkean conservatism. has an almost parallel character - to try 
consciously to remake. to plan the whole, is to exhibit the height or folly. 
1t need scarcely be added that the contemporary attitude 1s one or the 
control-model permeating all fields . It not merely reflects the vast eltpan­
sion of science. but also the desperate state of many of our problems, m 
which a weather-model would mean the acceptance or disasters. Of course 
even the attitude to the weather is changing too· the next generation may 
think such a name for a resignation-model rather queer and inaccurate. 
(2) The growing scope of the sci<!nlif 1c cntc rpri.�e. It was barely 
yesterday that arguments were still popular about the inherent limitations 
of science. First a sharp line was drawn between the physical and the 
human-social. and the latter declared out of bounds because 1t involves 
the particular, the subjective. the free will, the qualitative. and what not. 
Then parts of psychology and the social were surrendered . but the cul· 
tural and the historical were ideographic. empathetic, value-ridden. We 
need not track down clll the barriers that were thrust aside. ex course. 
the conception of science and its ways changed m the proce ss; it ceased 
being the universalistic mechanical-quantitative m the 19th century 
sense. proba.b1lity and statistics made their sweep into t.he human fie ld, 
generalized and refined mathematical conceptions or order upset the sharp 
distinct ion of quantity and quality; and so on. The outcome is that the 
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domain of knowledge lies open to the attempts of science . To attempt is 
not to succeed, of course, but the a priori limitations and the metaphys­
ical limitations seem to be a thing of the past. The domain of ignorance 
is and will be indefinitely vast. But from a practical point of view it can 
no longer be used as a priori veto on attempts at knowledge and control. 
In more stable days. it could be said that no experimental ventures should 
be made in human life which involved a plunge into the unknown , because 
disasters might result. Now the same argument often can be urged a­
gainst not making experimental ventures: for the consequences of contin· 
uing in the old ways in a rapidly changing world may be quite as un • 
knowable and quite as disastrous! This argument� of course, does not 
justify recklessness in experiment; we are learning how reckless we have 
been. But it also underlines the recklessness of conservatism too. In 
short. the emphasis falls on responsible inquiry and responsible attempts 
at control. The burden of responsibility falls with increasing weight on 
the scientific enterprise. 
(3) The ecological mode of thought. Part of the recklessness has 
come not from ignorance but from neglect of knowledge in other fields that 
either already exists or could be acquired . There is a changed mode of 
thought arising whicll we may call · 'ecological' · because it is so sharply 
illustrated in ecological studies. Its practical side is familiar enough; we 
have become very sensitive to the way in which attempts at control in 
one dir'ection have upset the balance of nature in others, as in the case of 
insecticides and the disposal of industrial wastes. In part this involves 
a demand that the application of knowledge be carried out in terms of the 
whole range of relevant knowledge available; in a recent column in the 
Sunday Times (January 4, 1970) James Reston quotes Prime Minister 
Clement Atlee's remark that when h e  concurred in President Truman's 
decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. they knew nothing about 
the genetic effects of fallout, though in fact, as Reston goes on to point 
out, H.J. Muller had won the Nobel Prize in 1927 for his evidence of the 
genetic ef�ects of radiation. Another aspect in the shift in outlook is a 
demand that one-sided evaluation should not dominate policy; for example, 
when oil from off-shore drilling springs a leak. the oil industry may worry 
about the seepage of salt water into oil, and the seashore population 
about dispersing the oil lest it cover the beachesp but it has also been 
pointed out that the chemical used �o disperse the oil may have a more 
deleterious effect on marine life than the oil itself! 
On the theoretical side, an ecological mode of thought involves a 
systems approach. in which there is not only a meeting of dilferent sci· 
ences in relation to a particular problem, but there may be a recasting of 
formulations in the hitherto isolated sciences. In this sense it may in 
part constitute a critique of isolated abstract formulation of knowledge 
42 
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itself in an unduly narrowed domain - the fallacy, for example. of the 
presidential candidate in the late 1920's who argued that the American 
economy was in nne shape but something happened abroad and it spread 
to cause the great depression. He failed to realize that the very descrip· 
tion of an economy in the modern world should be as part of a world­
sys tem. It is probably space research which most dramatizes the need for 
a full picture which combines the work of many sciences. When this is 
aw lied to the whole of human life. we begin to thiok of the planet itself 
as a space ship, a relatively closed system in which the cyclical proc­
esses maintaining a balance have to be known and reckoned w Jth if disas­
ter ls to be avoided. 
(4) The re lation of practice to theory in the scienti{h. enterprise. 
Practical questions are playing a greater role in scientific work today, 
in some very obvious ways. Experiment itself requires more extended use 
arxl orgamzatioo of resources. In part it is because developed sciences 
experiment over a broader field , as nuclear blasts m testing mvolve 
dealing with the stllte of a wide geograpluc area, or medical experiments 
may require a large population of subjects , or economic and political 
experiments have to take place in the on-going life of a society. In part 
it is because the very tools of testing and observation itself become 
large and complex technological achievements, whether it be the tele· 
scopes of astronomy a the staodardization of tests in psychology and the 
use of computers in behavioral science generally. In part it is because 
the field of practical application may itself be f umishmg a test in ex­
perience which if not a controlled experimental design may nevertheless 
add weight for or against a theoretical position; for example , the collapse 
a a bridge brings to a test tfle strength of the materials. the appearance 
of side·effects tests the safety of a drug, the day·by·day sessions of the 
psychoanalyst constitute some kind of check on the theory of therapy, and 
so oo. And in part it is because the subJect-matter of experiment in many 
areas, especially of social science, may itself be the practical issue of 
human well-being, so that the experiment itself is one of how effectively 
to diminish crime or use of drugs, achieve fewer family breakups, and so 
on: in fact this 1s widespread enough so that some theoretical attempts 
have been made to redefine the social sciences by human objectives, for 
mstance economics as the science of securing high productivity and wide 
distribution without depressions. 
In much of this, where the scientific study is of human beings, the 
integration of practical application and experiment becomes so close that 
they seem almost two different ways of saying the same thing from two 
different points or view. Thus in medicine the line grows thin between 
the experimental effect of a drug and its medical efficacy . In recent 
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governmental hearings on the contraceptive pill, one outcome was a 
recommendation tllat every doctor regard every use of it by a patient as 
an experiment. 
One could draw an interesting parallel from the history of thought 
between the integration of the e:npirical element in science and the symp­
toms of integration of the practical element now taking place . In the early 
history of the sciences it took a long time till experience got built into 
the notion of the scientific enterprise: before that the model of science 
was wholly mathematical-conceptual, as in ancient philosophy , and ex­
perience had merely an outside suggestive role. And in this shift, areas 
that were "merely empirioal" achieved respectability as fit subjects for 
science. Now practical application too has been traditionally conceived 
as having merely an illustrative role or a facilitating role. But its closer 
relations along the lines indicated above seem to bring it near to occupy­
ing the place of an insider in the scientific enterprise. Of course the 
integration of practical application within the complex of theory and ex· 
perience may be another way of saying that the concept of the scientific 
enterprise is itself being refashioned. And it may not hold for all of sci­
ence but only for a growing part. But this would not make the point Ques­
tion-begging, for the significant thing is that the scientific enterprise is 
thus bemg hist01ically refashioned. 
If the four tendencies outlined constitute a significant account of a 
trend in our understanding of the scientific enterprise, there will as a 
consequence be serious inroads on the traditional picture of science as 
value-free, admitting of individual devotion to the ideal of truth, but 
having only external relations to values, social policy, practice - in 
short, on the view that the scientist as individual er the scientist as 
citizen may have social responsibilities, but not as scientist . The central 
question to which the preceding discussion points is simply this: how is 
such a view of science possible in a world in which the scientific enter· 
prise has come increasingly to take a control-stance , to range over the 
whole of human life, to adopt an ecological mode of thought, and to bring 
practical application within the scope of its work? Does not such an 
emerging view of the scientific enterprise itself demand a social con­
science? 
It is possible. of course, to invok.e the metaphysical dogma of the 
sharp separation of value and fact to offer an a priori barrier to this de­
mand . I cannot here take time to discuss this barrier. which is now being 
qualified and questioned over a wide field in moral philosophy and the 
theory of knowledge. But in any case, it must not be assumed that science 
is equivalent to fact in such a dichotomy; science may very well involve 
some facts and some values. no matter how strongly the dogma be held to. 
I should like simply to point to one problem that the view will have to 
44 
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race. If the scientific enterprise is allowed an internal value of the pur­
suit of truth. it becomes an empirical matter how far into the value domain 
this carries the scientist. For be is committed to def ending the purswt or 
truth as scientist. not merely as citizen or individual. And if the picture 
of the world should happen to be even that only a particular political poli­
cy will preserve the pursuit of truth, and all others will subvert ll. he 
may find himselr as scientist committed to political action. Of course. 
there is the possibihty oC drawing back. It might be said that while the 
scientific euterprise, as a human affair, involves values. science as an 
ideal type or activity which has a place in the enterprise does not. But 
this, I snspe et ,  is a dosperate move. It will end up by saying that the 
aim of science is not truth. but only to discover theoretical systems to Cit 
accumulated datn: and the aim is not even to yield warranted beliefs, but 
only to show which t heoretiC'.al formulation� are assigned with what de­
grees or probability on the basis of what evidence . TI1is can, I think. be 
worked our to a refined extent. But the result will bear lirtle resemblance 
to what we tlunk of as the scieoufic enterprise: 1t is rather a particular 
redefinitioo or science, which has the burden of j11suf1cat1011 on its 
shoulders. And it would be question·begging for it to argue that 1t is 
justified because it would preserve the value-free character or science! 
ll: SOCIAL CONSCIENCE 
The social conscience or a society can be described as a pattern of 
assumed and ft-lt responsibiHty for others and concern for the well-being 
or people and for the solutioo or dominant social problems of the age. In 
ttue sense every society has some such pattern, as It has a specific 
soc1nl !Structure and specific social iost1tut10ns. lnd1viduals may, or 
course, differ h1 the extent and intensity in which they exhibic it. But the 
scope or social conscience, its node or expression, the kinds of topics 
oo which lt is directed. are histoncally variable and can be seen as 
socio-cultural formations . In fact. the only way really to understand the 
present chara�ter or our social conscience in its major structure as well 
as its hner shades is to see it as the outcome or a tustorical development 
of the last few centuries • 
By the 17th century, a new pattern of conscience was in the making. 
We need not enter into the background or the emergmg economic order m 
which an acquisitive mdividuaHsm became dominant, nor the religious 
break with the older authoritarian church as a result of whtch the lone 
individual directly faced his God. Soon it came to pass that the individual 
was no longer enmeshed in the guilt of original sin with its weight of 
ohli�uoos and hopeless struggles . He became increasingly an acomic 
will. exercising his choice and recognizing no obligation that did not 
issue from bis will. This moral voluntarism or. in mterperso11al and social 
45 
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relations. moral contractualism, became enshrined as an individualistic 
pattern. of obligations and responsibilities. It is clearly marked in politl· 
cal. legal, and moral theory. In politics the very state was conceived as 
contractual in origin: atomic individuals entered with an initial capital of 
natural rights , and took on burdens only by consent, for the effective 
maintenance and ex.pression of their rights. In law, the field of contract 
increasingly took over human relations that had been the subject of in­
stitutional regulation; in Maine's familiar phrase, the movement of pro­
gressive societies was from status to contract. In the theory of tort and 
crime, men went far toward shedding fault and responsibility for anything 
that could not be traced by direct connection to the:ir will-acts or by in­
direct connection to their negligence. 
It is perhaps the abstract regions of ethical theory that show most 
starkly the character of the shift. The older pattern of duties imposed on 
men by God's will and applied by derivation from natural law, without 
consulting individual will or consent, gives way to a primary dichotomy 
between self and 01her. In the "other'· are telescoped all the intermed­
iate kinds of ties - family, kin, small group, society at large. Mo1·a.1 
philosophers in the 18th centllfy, faced with Hobbes' stem egoism, feel 
it the primary task to justify benevolence, that is, to persuade the indi­
vidual sjtting on hls rights and mterests to stretch his hand away from 
himself toward others. his non-self. Th.ey seem to think. as Hobbes him­
self h.ad done, that a sober rationality will take a man beyond himself, 
even if only to protect h1mself, and a greater wisdom will find an identity 
of interest with others. that beneficence will be a good investment yield­
ing appropriate return, or that private profit pursued will redound to publlc 
well-being through the greater productivity it  brings. 
These roundabout routes for mustering a social conscience are f amil­
iaI enough. Nor were they questions of abstract theory alone. F'or their 
anxiot•s character retlected the breakdown in traditional ways of handling 
widespread poverty, suffering, and social displacement. The career of 
parish relief and poor laws in England. supplemented by Dickens' novels 
and the bitter history of trade union organizational struggles, is evidence 
enough. And the fact remains that by the time the 20th century outburst of 
industrial progress faced men with the familiar dislocation - industl'ial 
acx:idenr.s, unemployment, poverty, social insecurity - the intellectual 
equipment for social responsibility was utterly inadequate, and justifi­
cat10n for what w�s socially unavoidable and socially desirable had to be 
fashioned almost afresh. 
I need not recapitulate the familiar story of the 20th century growth 
of social respons ibility and the struggles, both theoretical and practical, 
that were waged to secure workmen's compensation, unemployment insur-
46 
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ance . social security. welfare support. medical care. extension of edu· 
cational opportunity, and so on. The general character of the moral shift 
was that something formerly conceived as a matter of individual responsi­
bilitv or individual hard ship - to be unable lo get a job used to be felt as 
a personal failing and to have an accident in industry was one's own 
tough luck - became conceived of as a burden to be socially carriect, paid 
f<X' either by contribution of those who stood to gain by the work m· 
through the general soc1al tax fund. It is a sombre paradox that ot'ten 
humane trea tment was argued for not by seemg a man as a fellow-man. 
but by seeing him as a factor in production whose depreciation should be 
borne t&' those who gain from using it up, just as they had to stand the 
losses in the wear and tear of machinery! But of course this presupposed 
that men, unlike worn-out machines, could not simply be thrown on the 
scrap-heap. or would not endure being so thrown. Nowadays even the 
scrap·heap has become a problem of social responsibility and the debate 
goes 011 whether pollution is to be faced as a social problem met through 
the tax fund or through throwing the burdens as "external costs" on the 
enterprises that produced the pollution as a normal part of their operation. 
But perhaps the best example of how far we have moved in developing a 
pattern cl social responsibility is the current consideration of a guarn.n­
teed minimum annual mc<>me. About a half a century ago, Bertrand Russell, 
in his Rocrds to rrecd om. (1918). advanced the idea of a "vagabond 
� · •, a 111ini111u111 support everyone should be given. Russell assumed 
enough µeople would want more than that.. and so keep the wheels of in· 
dustry going, and lus Justification was that those who were content with 
little because they wanted leisure and philosophy and the pursuit 01· the 
impractical should be allowed this option. Compare this today with Milton 
Friedman's advocacy of a "negative income tax1' to assure a minimum 
income. The grounds are quite different - an attempt to cut through the 
welfare system and increase individual control over his own spending, a 
realization that the economy has to give at 1 east minimal support to people 
and can now afford it, and so on. Friedman's advocacy is of course Crom 
the premises of the political right in American economic thought; the 
center and the left have other grounds. But all three meet on some form 
cf guaranteed annual income. However diverse or murky the roots, social 
responsibility is clearly expanding its scope. 
The growth of a soci<ll conscience in all these ways does not1 how­
ever, spell the end of the individualistic tradition in morality. Strangely 
enough. it is becommg more, not less powerfu 1. and takil•g over provinces 
hitherto marked as social. Perhaps the most extreme form of individualist 
reconstruction is seen in the rise of individual responsibility ugttinsl 
authority and the state, as contrasted with the older social conception of 
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patriotism and obedience and loyalty. A number of diverse forces had fed 
this growth of individual judgment. One is no doubt the weakening of 
patriotism as a dominant binding relation, in the development of the wider 
loyalties of a growingly unified humanity . A great share of causal respon· 
sibility goes to the discrediting of the mystique of the state in the evi­
dence of Hitlerism and its deeds ; this is best seen in the outcome of the 
Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders. in which even disobedience to mili­
tary commands is enjoined where basically immoral action is commanded. 
Professor Milton R. Konvitz, in his recent book on Religious Liberty and 
Consc ience (1968) has called our attention to the fact that this principle 
of the Nuremberg trials is now established in international law, that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations includes 
recognition of conscience apart from its relation to religion, that even in 
Catholi cism with its doctrine of papal infallibility, there has been the 
recognition of conscience in Vatican Council II. not as a new right but as 
a continuing traditional doctrine; and he concludes that the case for con­
stitutional recognition of conscience in the United States is even stronger 
than that which supports freedom of association! I think that a third factor 
in elevating individual Judgment lies in the lessons of experience with 
intellectual repression - for example, such impositions of ideological 
dogmatism in the Soviet Union as the notorious Lysenko affair and its 
domination of genetics. or our own experience of the drive for conformity 
in the so-called McCarthy period of the 1950's. Writing at the opening of 
that decade, in his The Fear of Freedom (1951), Francis Biddle, who had 
served as Attorney General and now surveyed the growing hysteria. was 
led to question the whole idea of disloyalty to the government. If govem­
ment is the servant of the people , how can a man be expected to be loyal 
to the government rather than the government as servant loyal � the 
master? Summoning Josiah Royce's conception of loyalty in his Philoso­
phy of Loyalty ( 1908), Biddle concluded that men are loyal to their ideals. 
and that ideals cannot be dictated but are the individual's own choice. In 
the 1960's a fourth factor was added in our experience - the Civil Rights 
movement, in which legality was on the side of discrimination, and later, 
the opposition to the Vietnam war. The growth of civil disobedience as a 
technique of social change has thus been rapid , and the movement to give 
greater legal scope to conscience - ror example, to allow conscientious 
opposition to a particular war, not merely to war itself, as a ground for 
draft-exemption - is a serious one. In any case, the firmness of contemp­
orary civil disobedience often has the same character as Luther 's famous 
' 'Here stand I. I cannot otherwise", and the puritanical moral character of 
some contemporary youth revolt makes us understand the remark of a 17th 
century secularist who said "I had rather meet coming against me a whole 
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regiment with drawn swords than one Calvinist convinced that he is doing 
the will of God." 
The ambivalent attitude to individual judgment in contemporary so· 
ciety reflects, I believe. two conn1cting forces. On the one hand the 
growth of corporate enterprise and large-scale organization presses for 
conformity. Bnt on the other. the very complexity of the technological and 
social organization and the weight of problems and the rapidity of change 
in all fields of life demand a high degree of inventiveness. individual 
initiative in thought. a constant stream of new ideas. And so we have 
almost the paradox of noncomformity becoming a conformist demand. The 
weight of individual decision and the lack of social gmdance for decision 
in many areas of life is far greater than it has ever been. 
On the theoretical side too, the individualistic form of morality has 
been growing rather than receding. The treatment of morality as autono­
mous decision was already central to Kantian ethics. He gave it the 
special form of universal legislation by the free individual for the com­
munity of rational beings. Since then the legislative aspect has moved 
into the background, but the decisional element has become more and more 
pronounced. This is not a feature of any one type of ethical theory, but 
fairly common to diverse types. Thus a naturalistic ethics like Dewey·s. 
with an integral stress on the scientific and the social. pinpoints a really 
moral problem not as one in which a man is fighting temptation to do what 
is moral. but one in which he is moved by opposing principles or values 
and has to decide what is the moral thing to do; and traditional ethical 
theory is recast by him in a methodological vein to provide the best avail­
able mode of decision m a flux of human, social and individual, problem­
situations, under changing historical conditions. And a subjectivistic 
ethics like Sartre's, postulating complete human freedom , also focuses on 
the momentousness of present decision, with no reliance on a God .. a 
human nature, a past trend of choice, a dependence on others' advice, 
since to reach out to any of these is itself a choice. Sometimes even 
analytic ethics - Hare, for example , - finds every invocation of principle 
a prescriptive decision, as shal'ply as in Sartre's view. 
And yet, though individual decision and individual responsibility are 
the central focus of theoretical developments, it is no longer the old 
individualism of the atomic self, cut off by initial stipulation from society 
as its opposite . Dewey's individualism is rather proposing individuality, 
the rich development or the per�on, as a �ocial goal for education and 
morals and social institutions. And Sartre's intensely individual focus 
has him assume responsibility for all that is immoral around him. A man 
cannot, says Sartre , shift off responsibility for a war that he had no part 
in making; for he could always be asked what he has done to stop it. The 
depth of social responsibility for the individual conscience in the moral 
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philosophies of today is central. no longer peripheral or a good business 
transa.ction. 
If I had time to explore this further, I should want to suggest that 
what is happening is a long overdue breakdown of the individual-social 
dichotomy , that both the growth of our knowledge of man and the develop­
ment of our complex interrelated modern life make this dichotomy less 
significant for understanding what a man is, what kind of self he develops 
and what his obligations and responsibilities are. The dichotomy is recog­
nized more and more as the historical cleavage of a particular type of 
life and society which is going by. It is not yet clear what kind of cate­
gories will emerge as central in ethic s and human understanding. At the 
present time that of the active or creative, as against the fixed, looms 
large, but this too may be reflecting the intensity of change . Yet it does 
contain the permanent lesson that man's self-knowledge is an active 
point of self-reconstruction rather tllan a learning of what is already 
fixed by nature . Tbis lesson was already clear in the 19th century. In 
historical terms it is found in the Marxian conception of freedom as the 
growth of human awareness of the laws of the world and man which en­
ables man to make greater progress in the attainment of his human values. 
In individualistic subjective f-erms \t is clearly stated by Kierkegaard 
when in his Either/Or he contrasts the Socratic moral maxim of "Know 
Thyself" with his own maxim of · 'Choose Thyself.' ' The passage is well 
worth .quoting: 
The ethical individual knows himself. but this know­
ledge is not a mere contemplation (for which the individual 
is determined by his necessity), it is a reflection upon 
himself which itself is an action, and therefore I have delib­
erately pref erred to use the expression "choose oneself,, 
instead of ''know oneself. " So when the individual knows 
himself he is not through; on the contrary, this knowledge is 
in the highest degree fruitful, and from it proceeds the true 
individual. If I desired to be clever I might say at this point 
that the individual knew himself in such a way as Adam 
"knew·� Eve in the Old Testament sense of the word. By the 
individual's intercourse with himself he impregnates himself 
and brings himself to birth. 
(Doubleday and Co .. Anchor Books, Lowrie translation. 
vol. II, p. 263.) 
And so morality is self-making and society-making and there is no cut 
between the two. The growth of social conscience in the contemporary 
world represents a profound transformation in the life of men, breaking 
into their consciousness and reshaping thought and sentiment, and crea­
ting tl1e opportunity for a freer reconstruction. Whatever be the precise 
50 
13
Edel: The Scientific Enterprise and Social Conscience
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1970
ABRAHAM EDEL 
historical and social forces that have brought it about. it has a growing 
firmness which imparts to it the voice of Judgment. It is therefore with 
this conscience and its demands that the scientist must reckon as he 
attempts to shape - whethe r to expand or limit - the responsibilities of 
his profession. 
Ill: . . .  AND . . .  
Let us now ask what role the scientist should take in relation to the 
social conscience, what specific pattern of responsibilities he should 
accept and assume. On the one hand, the scope of scientific knowledge 
suggests the greater share in the social conscience; on the other. the 
high standard s of evidence and the disinterested character of scientific 
inquiry suggest distinguishing sharply between the scientist and the 
citizen and assigning responsibility to a man as citii.en or as mdividual, 
not as scientist. In the latter case too, he might even as citizen plead 
draft-exemption frcxn social activism on grounds of occupation! 
There are two ways to deal with this line of argument. One is basi­
cally revolutionary in the sphere or thought, tor it upsets the categories 
and dichotomies in terms of which the question is framed . Thus lt may 
wall be said that the role-playing which distinguishes between the man 
as scientist, as citizen, as md1vidua l, and so forth, is becoming an in· 
creasingly meaningless game , lhat it will go the way or the older distinc· 
tions between the economic man and the moral, or the self as individual 
and the self as social. There are of course particular moral problems of 
conflict in virtue of different relationships, but there is no general parti­
tioning of the person and his responsibility; both man and human life are 
by now becoming too integrated for that, and even in the past such dis­
tinctions were never more t.han relative isolation of systems and practices 
in a basically unified human lire. The second path is less drastic: it is 
the argument that even if one wishes to preserve the distinctions between 
the various roles. the decision about what social responsibilities fa 11 
within whtch role is itself a scientific or empirical one, contextual rather 
than general. The second path is the one I want to pursue here, t.hough I 
think in the long run the first is the more profound, yer. to be more than a 
general insight it wi11 have to work out its detailed modes or assigning 
responsibilities. 
Suppose then that the scientist argues against taking a policy stand 
on social matters because as scientist he 1s aware of the vast amount o f  
justifymg evidence needed in authoritative judgment; one has fewer 
cognitive responsibilities if one judges social matters as a citizen or as 
an individual. since it permits more subjective judgment! The difficulty 
is, however. that on many questions the scientist knows the central evi­
dence only as a scientist - the genetic effects of nuclear fallout as a 
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biologist, the inflationary effects of the Vietnam war as an economist. the 
psychological effects of ghetto life as a social psychologist, and so on. 
As a private citizen. he might have had quite a�rrant notions. Of course. 
part of the evidence may come from other scientific fields , not his own. 
And part may indeed be just his belief as a layman. lf these scruples 
stand in the way of expressing a scientific social judgment, the scientific 
thing to do is not to plead subjectivity and individual bias. but to be roore 
precise about the extent of his evidence, and specify credentials . Thus a 
particular social stand by biologists might be advanced with the adden­
dum: 703 as biologists, 103 as relying on economis ts, 123 as general in­
tellectual (all intellectuals presumably having a more sharpened sense of 
evidence or relevance), 53 as citizen (in tem1s of accepted social obli­
gations),  and 33 as individual subjective conviction. Think of the gen­
erally educative effect of such pronouncements; if a classification were 
developed for social judgments , think of the height of sophistication if 
the public could respond to a flaming headline - ''Political Scientists 
issue 4D condemnation of federal pollution policy: ecologists concur with 
2A resolution''!  
Sometimes I have the impression that the scientists' plea for exemp­
tion from social judgment as scientists is a normative judgment quite 
parallel to the plea of an occupation for automatic draft-exemption on the 
ground of its social importance. Scientists are too busy for political acti­
vism. or incipient rebellion. or anything of that sort. Yet here again. the 
answer is unfortunately not open to antecedent determination. Whether or 
how much rebellion is involved is an empirical matter and depends of the 
state of the country and the character of the issues. In Nazi Germany, to 
make a biological assertion about the lack of evidence for Aryan superior­
ity, was probably equivalent to revolt_ And in the Oppenheimer case, we 
may recall, it was a scientific hesitation about the feasibility of the hy­
drogen bomb that played some part, as well as moral consideration of the 
consequences of pushing on with its development. But a large part of 
social action that can fall into the province of scientists is scarcely of 
this dramatic kind. Many social questions are not a matter of introducing 
new and revolutionary categories, but of shifting some area from one cate­
gory that is accepted to another category that is also accepted_ Thus if 
ecologists want a nationally directed water policy or economists and 
sociologists want a governmental housing industry. they need not be 
voting on socialism vs. capitalism. The categories exist within our soci­
ety: for example . ow· army is a collective institution - we do not adver­
tise a war to be waged by the lowest private bidder. (The post-office is a 
more customary example.) Nor was the recent suggestion in New York that 
subway rides should be free. an anarchistic-collectivist aspiration :  it was 
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simply saying that subways should be the same kind of municipal service 
as garbage collection. Certainly these are sooial-science issues in laq;e 
part. I am reminded of the clarity with which, if I recall a newspaper 
account aright, Milton Friedman. when te was testifying for 100 negative 
income-tax. cut through the remark of a Senator to the effect that at least 
people who got public money in this way should forfeit their right to vote ; 
te replied that if )Altting one's hands in the public trough warranted loss 
of the vote , business men would be the first to lose it. 
Turning finally to types of social responsibility for the scientific 
enterprise, a number of different ones may be distinguished. They are 
ordered from the nearer to t.he farther out; some of them would fall on indi­
vidual scientists. some would more effectively be carried out by scien­
tists in associated groups . 
There are, first, obligations that arise in the pursuit o f  the scientific 
work itself. I do not refer to the moral obligations of truth and scrupulous 
evidence . but to obligations in the professional and public milieu with 
respect to the work itself. For example. Bentley Glass, in his Science 
and Ethical Values, lists such obligations as: to publish one's methods 
and results in such a way that another may confirm and extend the results; 
to see that one's work is properly abstracted and indexed: to write critical 
reviews in the field; to communicate to the general public the new great 
revelations of science; to transmit the knowledge to the succeeding gen­
eration. Note that such obligations follow from the state of the field as 
well as the general objecr.ives of the enterprise; thus proper indexing 
rises to importance because of the stream of contributions to the con­
temporary warld , so that the dangers of work being lost in plenty are very 
real in some fields. Again, the obligation to ensure communication to the 
general public probably reflects the tremendous importance of a wide base 
of public understanding if the lessons of Kcience are to play a part in the 
advance of culture and social life: this obHgation is distorted if scien­
tists think of it only as a way of ensuring financial support for science. 
It is not implied of course that every scientist has to be busy on all these 
fronts. Some of the obligations can be carried out in an organized prcr 
fessional or even institutional way - for example, the rise of scientific 
journalism as a profession itself - rather than as an additional burden to 
a scientist who may not be gifted in this respect. But the scientific 
awareness and a:s:>lBtance in thia area is the obligation. flgain, while 
there is no scientific obligation to be polemical in respect to conflicting 
theories and approaches, the obligation to do critical reviews seems to 
suggest not only the wider purview of the field but the participation in 
the sharpening of theoretical approaches. 
ThE:re are, in the second place, direct social responsibilities to 
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others who are mvolved m the work or come within its ambit. Types of 
such responsibilities are extremely varied. Familiar examples are medi­
cal researchers to subjects; psychological experiments which involve 
lying to or misleading the subjects (e.g., the extreme case of the Milgram 
electric shock tests, in which the subject is told to increase an alleged 
electric shock in order to see where the subject will revolt and draw the 
line as he watches the faked tortured response); relations of anthropolo· 
gists to informants in the native villages whose ordinary relations may be 
quite upset after t.he researcher's departure; questions of invasion of 
privacy of informants in modes of research and modes of publication; 
participant observation as a technique and its effects: a.nd so on. 
There is again, the general responsibility, already noted, of main­
taining the conditions under which science can be continued . This we 
saw, may become a matter of direct political participation where the gen­
eral freedom of inquiry is threatened on a large scale. Other issues may 
have .a comparable status. For example, the imposition of secrecy on 
research projects where they are connected with military or political 
applications has been much opposed by scientists as a hindrance to the 
free flow of scientific communication. The imposition of political qualifi­
cations on scientists as a condition of engaging in research is often seen 
as disruptive of the community of science and its professional criteria. 
There is no advance way of  knowmg what kind of conditions may turn out 
to interfere with scientific work and progress, but when scientists indi­
vidually or in organized fashion oppose these conditions, it is as a sci­
entific responsibility, or an exercise of a scientific social conscience. 
Moving gradually ioto the social context of scientific work, it would 
seem to be a scientist's responsibility to know or be aware of the various 
social relations of his scientific work - how it is supported and financed, 
what practical purposes motivate the support and the work, what appli­
cations are likely to be made of it, who will benefit and who will be af­
fected in what way. and so on. So far l speak merely of the obligation not 
to remain in the dark on these matters. Many such questions have often 
been raised - for example, whether certain psychological work is pri­
marily for increasing the efficacy of advertising by finding the depth hold 
of certain symbols; whether in a given period British anthropological 
study might have been furnishing the knowledge for the maintenance of 
empire over native peoples; whether P:roject Camelot was not, in spite of 
the latitude for disinterested iesearch it would allow to reputable social 
scientists. primarily a preparation for preventing and suppressing often 
needed revolutionat·y �hanges; whether particular research in some areas 
might not be sponsored by industrial interests in order to secure patents 
and hold back marketing the products to avoid competition with present 
processes ;  and so on. 
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Knowledge about one's scientific work and its context as just indi­
cated would seem to cart'y some responsibility for decision - whether to 
abandon the research under these conditions , to oo it but make public or 
agitate against its intended applications, to work out alternative ways of 
carrying it on, and so forth. With the development of large -scale problems 
of this sort in our scientific culture, paradigms may well be established 
in the ethical code of the profession. For example, research in biological 
warfare might well have been banned by scientists even before its recent 
partial rejection by national edict; and many fuzzy borderlines still re­
main to be dealt with. It is not inconceivable that a union of engineers 
should include in its bargaining with a given corporation, provision of 
available processes of disposing of wastes that should not be adding to 
pollution of the environment, just as a teachers' union may include in its 
bargaining the provision of school breakfasts or lunches for childre n - in 
part because of the help this gives to the educational process, in p.art 
because of the general obligation for the welfare of those affected .  
Where there are major, central, and generally recogni zed crucial prob­
lems affecting the whole life of the society, it may well be a responsi­
bility of all intellectual, scientific and cultural leadership in the commun­
ity to ask itself what it can do to help face the problems. Thus in our 
contemporary world one could pinpoint the problems of war, discrimin­
ation in its various forms ,  over-population, poJlution of the environment 
and exhaustion of natural resources as the four great threats to mankind. 
Hence there would be no question about the scope of social conscience 
in general with respect to them, and about the obligation of scientists to 
ask themselves what their fields could do to ameliorate the situation . In 
fact, the obligation of scientists here is directly greater because of the 
part science has played in generating the situation, even where its action 
was directly beneficial a.s in increasing life expectancy by reducing in­
fant mortality, and much more so where it gave the instruments to blindly 
acquisitive business institutions. Excellent examples of the way in which 
this obligation of science to crucial problems and threats was exercised 
are: the react.ion of anthropologists in the '30's to Nazi racialism; of 
atomic scientists in organizing to agitate for controls of nuclear power 
against war uses, in the '40's and '50's; the work of psychologists on the 
psychological study of social issues. The geneticists nowadays are much 
worri�d about the impending break-through in their field and the questions 
of control over human biological development it may raise, even to the 
extent of what kind of controls would be exercised and in whose hands 
they should lie. 
Let ma conclude with a few reflections on the modes of action a 
sense of social responsibility among scientists may call for. Again there 
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is no over-simple answer. We may disr.inguish individual action, informal 
group action. and action in structured associational groups. Individual 
action may take the form of public criticism. or following the demands of 
conscience about withdrawal from a field of work, or engaging in some 
form of political action. Informal group action has tended to be ad hoc; it 
is a familiar feature of our society to see advertisements of scientists on 
the question of the Vietnam war, or on over-population. or occasionally 
even on some particular flagrant injustice. 
Organized group action is less developed. We may distinguish brief1y 
three types. One is the exercise of negative fighting functions, parallel to 
strikes by union for specific demands: this has not been employed very 
much by organized scientists. but is quite conceivable in the present 
state of things. The second is the exercise of what we may call a ferment­
function. to generate all sorts of new ideas and plans and intensify con­
sciousness of the problems and possible solutions tfor example even the 
minimal educative function of showing. how decisions are actually come 
by). The third is what we may thmk of as institution-making. This last 
has in some sense been more common than we may think. Thus the de­
velopment of insurance as an idea was a mathematical discovery which 
underlies vast social transformation in modern societies. though not 
directly applied by scientists themselves. Group Medicine was an in· 
vention of medical practitioners. The development of clinics for psycho­
therapy,  the growth of schools for mentally ill children. had their rise in 
the work of professionals and readily passed into ,government j)rograms . 
Recent attempts to organize the poor for taking part in a concerted pur­
suit of their welfare rather than being passive cases also had its pro­
fessional origins. There is nothing implausible in cmtent suggestions 
that organized scientists market their own discoveries for public welfare. 
for example. in dmgs or even in certain industries. We may compar� the 
fostering of housing and banks by certain unions. or even the suggestion 
that Harold Ickes made after World War II that what the government had 
built up for industry during war production re turned over to a corporation 
with all veterans as shareholders instead of being sold at a cheap price 
to industrial corporations. Of course such suggestions run up against the 
realities of basic power and all the issues of the so-called military-in­
dustrial complex in our present society. and the issues of class-structure 
and class-conflict. But these concern possible outcomes and controver­
sial theoretical analyses. The amount of free play in our society would be 
tested by social experiments along these lines. My point is simply that 
there are. large avenues for the legitimate exercise of the social con­
science of scientists. far beyond the mere expression of a collective 
voice where there is one. There could very well be a section of the AAAS 
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oo ins!ituhon-makmg, and another section on mternational scientific 
cooperation. for example on implementmg the abOlition of biolo�ical war­
fare . lt may not even be too early to think about the possibilities of mter­
national citizenship for scientists' 
There should be nothing surprising m ow �eneral conclusions abcntt 
the scienrific enterprise and social consc1enc e .  Nearly every group m our 
society - from business to policemen to teachers - finds no difficulty in 
talking about its social respons1b1lines. Why has there been confusion 
about it m the case of the scientific enterprise? At least one philosophi<'­
al reason, apmt from historical and sociologlcal ones. has been the con­
ception of sc1ence - the strange mixture of the timorous and the lordly 
stance - which attempted to give a smgle answ<?r m terms of a pamcular 
conception of the lone scientist as intrinsically a truth- seeker . I have 
tried to show that this is both narrow and wide - narrow because it 1�­
nores the understanding of the scientific enterprise m terms of its chang­
ing historical relations. and wide because the very pursuit of truth itself 
if raced as a path in the comemporary world carries its practitioner much 
tarther than he may think oo empmcal and his torical grounds. I conclude 
that instead or a sm�le simple question we have here a whole are,t of 111-
4uiry which calls fa an answer by a science of the psychological. soc10-
culrural and historical relauons of the scientific enterpnse . that ttns kmd 
of mquuy shows the responsibilities of the enterprise to be vastly greater 
and vastly more permeating in contemporary life than the consciousness 
of the scient.ist has hitherto generally yielded on isolated introspection. 
and that n is long past time for consciousness to catch up with the reali­
ties it purports to represent. 
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